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Abstract
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the
seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a
buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller
receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real world markets, asking
prices have received little attention in the academic literature. We construct an environment
with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal:
it is the pricing mechanism that maximizes sellers’ revenues and it implements the efficient
outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it
to explore the implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.
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“We are eager to hear ... about businesses that meet all of the following criteria:
(1) Large purchases; (2) Demonstrated consistent earning power; (3) Businesses earning good
returns on equity while employing little or no debt; (4) Management in place; (5) Simple
businesses; (6) An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller
by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown)... We don’t
participate in auctions.”1
– Berkshire Hathaway Inc., “Acquisition Criteria,” 2012 Annual Report
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider an environment in which a trading mechanism that we call an asking
price emerges as an optimal way of coping with certain frictions. In words, an asking price is
a price at which a seller commits to taking his good off the market and trading immediately.
However, it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and such an
offer could potentially be accepted if the seller receives no better offers.2 Though asking prices
are prevalent in a variety of real world markets, they have received relatively little attention in
the academic literature. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and
demonstrate that using an asking price is both revenue-maximizing and efficient; that is, sellers
optimally choose to use the asking price mechanism and, in equilibrium, the asking prices they
select implement the solution to the planner’s problem. We provide a complete characterization
of this equilibrium and use it to explore the implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction
prices and allocations.
At first glance, one might think that committing to an asking price would be sub-optimal from
a seller’s point of view. After all, the seller is not only placing an upper bound on the price that
a buyer might propose, he is also committing not to meet with any additional prospective buyers
once the asking price has been offered. Hence, when a buyer purchases the good at the asking
price, the seller has forfeited any additional rents that either this buyer or other prospective buyers
were willing to pay. And yet, anybody who has recently purchased a house or a car, rented an
apartment, or perused the classifieds knows that an asking price seems to play a prominent role
in the sale of many goods (and services). The question is: how and why can this mechanism be
optimal?
1Bold added for emphasis; italics present in original.
2What we call an asking price goes by several other names as well, including an “offering price” (as in the epi-
graph), a “list price” (used in the sale of houses and cars), or a “buy-it-now” or “take-it” price (used in certain online
marketplaces). In many classified advertisements, what we call an asking price often comes in the form of a price
followed by the comment “or best offer.” Though the terminology may differ across these various markets, along
with the fine details of how trade occurs, we think our analysis identifies an important, fundamental reason that sellers
might find this basic type of pricing mechanism optimal.
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Loosely speaking, our answer requires two ingredients. First, the sellers in our environment
compete to attract buyers. In particular, in contrast to the large literature that studies the perfor-
mance of various trading mechanisms (e.g., auctions) when the number of buyers is fixed, we
assume that there are many sellers, each one posts (and commits to) the process by which their
good will be sold, and buyers strategically choose to visit only those sellers who promise the max-
imum expected payoff. Thus, in our framework, the number of buyers at each seller is endogenous
and responds to the mechanism that the seller posts. The second ingredient is that the goods for
sale are inspection goods and inspection is costly: though all sellers’ goods appear ex ante iden-
tical, in fact each buyer has an idiosyncratic (private) valuation for each good which can only be
learned through a process of costly inspection.3
To understand the role that each of these ingredients play, let’s first consider inspection costs
in isolation. When buyers have to incur a cost to learn their valuation and trade, a natural tension
arises. Ceteris paribus, a seller wants to maximize the number of buyers who inspect his good and
the offers that these buyers make. However, without any device to limit the number of buyers or
the offers they make, buyers might be hesitant to approach such a seller, as the cost of inspecting
the good could outweigh the potential benefits of discovering their valuation and trying to outbid
all the other buyers. Instead, buyers would only incur the up-front costs of inspection if they are
assured a reasonable chance of actually acquiring the good at a reasonable price.
We show that, by setting an asking price, sellers can provide buyers with this assurance. For
one, an asking price implements a stopping rule, allocating the good to the first buyer who has a
sufficiently high valuation, and sparing the remaining potential buyers from inspecting the good
“in vain.” In this sense, echoing the sentiments of Berkshire Hathaway’s chairman Warren Buffett
in the epigraph above, the asking price mechanism in our model serves as a promise by sellers not
to waste the buyers’ time and energy when they have only a small chance of actually getting the
good. Moreover, by committing to sell at a particular price, a seller who uses an asking price is
also assuring potential buyers that they will receive some gains from trade in the event that they
discover a high valuation. For these reasons, sellers have a strong incentive to use an asking price
when they are selling inspection goods.
However, they also have a strong incentive to charge buyers an admission fee to inspect their
3For example, suppose the goods are houses that are roughly equivalent along easily describable dimensions (size,
general location, and so on). However, each home has idiosyncratic features that may make them more or less attractive
to every prospective buyer, and these features are revealed upon inspection; e.g., an individual who likes to cook will
want to examine a home’s kitchen. Quite often, learning one’s true valuation may require more research than is
afforded by a quick tour; e.g., an individual who needs to build a home office may want to bring in an architect to
get an estimate of how much it will cost. All of these activities are costly, either because they take time or because
they require explicit costs (like hiring an architect). Similar costs exist for purchasing a car, renting an apartment, or
even hiring an accountant. Perhaps surprisingly, these costs can even be significant for buyers purchasing goods on
websites such as eBay or Craigslist, as documented by Bajari and Hortacsu (2003).
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good, extracting all of the additional surplus they created by eliminating inefficient inspections.
Such fees are problematic from a positive point of view, as they are rarely observed in practice.
This is where our second ingredient is important: we show that, in an environment in which sellers
compete to attract buyers, the optimal admission fee is, in fact, zero. Thus, in an environment with
these two ingredients, sellers maximize their profits by posting a simple mechanism, composed
of one asking price for all buyers, and no fees, side payments, or other rarely observed devices.
Moreover, the asking price that sellers choose ultimately maximizes the expected surplus that they
create, so that equilibrium asking prices implement the planner’s solution.
Having provided the rough intuition, we now discuss our environment and main results in
greater detail. As we describe explicitly in Section 2, we consider a market with a measure of
sellers, each endowed with one indivisible good, and a measure of buyers who each have unit
demand. Though goods appear ex ante identical, each buyer has an idiosyncratic valuation for
each good and this valuation can only be learned through a costly inspection process. We assume
that sellers have the ability to communicate ex ante (or “post”) how their good is going to be sold,
and buyers can observe what each seller posts and visit the seller that offers the highest expected
payoff. The search process, however, is frictional: each buyer can only visit a single seller and he
cannot coordinate this decision with other buyers. As a result, the number of buyers to arrive at
each seller is a random variable with a distribution that depends on what the seller posted.
As a first step, in Section 3 we characterize the solution to the problem of a social planner
who maximizes total surplus, subject to the frictions described above—in particular, the search
frictions and the requirement that a buyer’s valuation is costly to learn. The solution has three
properties. First, the planner instructs buyers to randomize evenly across sellers. Second, once a
random number of buyers arrive at each seller, the planner instructs buyers to undergo the costly
inspection process sequentially, preserving the option to stop after each inspection and allocate the
good to one of the buyers who have learned their valuation. This strategy of “sequential search
with recall” is optimal because it balances the losses associated with additional buyers incurring
the inspection cost against the gains associated with finding a buyer who values the good more
than all of the previous buyers. Finally, we characterize the optimal stopping rule for this strategy
and establish that it is stationary; that is, it depends on neither the number of buyers who have
inspected the good nor the realization of their valuations.
Next, we move on to our main contribution: we consider the decentralized economy, character-
ize the trading mechanism that emerges in equilibrium, and study the efficiency properties of this
equilibrium. Given the nature of the planner’s optimal trading protocol, the asking price mech-
anism is a natural candidate to implement the efficient outcome. First, since buyers’ valuations
are privately observed, the asking price provides sellers a channel to elicit information about these
valuations. Second, since the asking price triggers immediate trade, it implements a stopping rule,
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thus preventing additional buyers from incurring the inspection cost when the current buyer draws
a sufficiently high valuation. Finally, since the seller also allows bids below the asking price, he
retains the option to recall previous offers in which there was a positive match surplus.
These features are captured by the following game, which we study in Section 4. First, sellers
post an asking price, which all buyers observe. Given these asking prices, each buyer then chooses
to visit the seller (or mix between sellers) offering the maximal expected payoff. Once buyers arrive
at their chosen seller, they are placed in a random order. Buyers are told neither the number of other
buyers who have arrived, nor their place in the queue.4 The first buyer incurs the inspection cost,
learns his valuation, and can either purchase the good immediately at the asking price or submit
a counteroffer. If he chooses the former, trade occurs and all remaining buyers at that particular
seller neither inspect the good nor consume. If he chooses the latter, the seller moves on to the
second buyer (if there is one) and the process repeats until either the asking price is offered or the
queue of buyers is exhausted, in which case the seller can accept the highest offer he has received.
We derive the optimal bidding behavior of buyers and the optimal asking prices set by sellers,
characterize the equilibrium, and show that it coincides with the solution to the planner’s problem.
The fact that our asking price mechanism can implement the efficient allocation is surprising for
a number of reasons, as we discuss at the end of Section 4. Chief among them, implementing the
planner’s allocation requires achieving efficiency along two margins: the allocation of the good
after buyers arrive, along with the number of buyers that arrive to begin with. However our asking
price mechanism affords sellers only a single instrument that controls both margins; the asking
price determines both the ex-post allocation of the good (by implementing a stopping rule) and the
ex-ante expected number of buyers (by specifying the division of the expected surplus).
After establishing that the asking price mechanism implements the solution to the planner’s
problem, we ask whether sellers would indeed choose to use the asking price mechanism, or if
there exists an alternative mechanism that could potentially increase sellers’ profits. To address
this question, in Section 5 we consider a similar environment to the one described above, but we
allow sellers to select from a more general set of mechanisms. In doing so, we are essentially
providing sellers with the option to choose a trading protocol from a large set of extensive form
games, in which they are free to make different specifications about the sequence of events, the
strategies available to buyers under various contingencies, and even the information that buyers
have when they select from these strategies.5 In this more general environment, we establish that
4As we discuss below, we consider the information made available to buyers to be an endogenous feature of the
pricing mechanism.
5Indeed, the mechanisms that are available to sellers range from “plain vanilla” pricing schemes—such as auctions,
price-posting with rationing, multilateral bargaining games, etc.—to much more complicated games, in which the
rules and sequence of play, as well as the information made available to the players, could depend on the number of
buyers who arrive at a seller, an individual buyer’s place in the queue, the behavior of other buyers, and so on. In
short, perhaps the only relevant type of trading mechanism that we do not allow are those that depend on the trading
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the asking price mechanism we study in Section 4 maximizes a seller’s payoff, regardless of the
mechanisms posted by other sellers. As a consequence, there always exists an equilibrium in which
all sellers use the asking price mechanism described above. Moreover, while other equilibria can
exist, they are all payoff-equivalent; in particular, there is no equilibrium in which sellers earn
higher expected payoffs than they do in the equilibrium with asking prices. Finally, we show that
any mechanism that emerges as an equilibrium in this environment will resemble the asking price
mechanism along most important dimensions. Therefore, though we cannot rule out potentially
complicated mechanisms that also satisfy the equilibrium conditions, the fact that asking prices
are both simple and commonly observed suggests that they are a robust and compelling way to
deal with the frictions in our environment.
In Section 6, we flesh out just a few of the model’s implications for a variety of observable
outcomes. In particular, we study the level of asking prices set by sellers and the corresponding
distribution of transaction prices that occur in equilibrium. We examine how these variables change
with features of the environment, such as the ratio of buyers to sellers, the degree of ex ante
uncertainty in buyers’ valuations, and the costs of inspecting the good.
In Section 7, we discuss a few of our key assumptions, along with several interesting extensions
of our basic framework. For one, we show that a simple variation of our asking price mechanism
would produce a distribution of transaction prices that occur below the asking price, a mass point of
transactions that occur at the asking price, and additional transactions that occur above the asking
price. This variation, which preserves all of the normative properties reported above, could be an
important step towards confronting, e.g., house prices.6 We also discuss how allowing for hetero-
geneity across goods could lead to endogenous market segmentation, where each sub-market has
a different asking price, a different market tightness, and subsequently produces different patterns
for prices and allocations. Finally, Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs.
Related Literature. We contribute to the literature along two dimensions. The first is norma-
tive: we show that our asking price mechanism is both revenue-maximizing and efficient in an
environment with two simple ingredients. The second is positive: we provide a rationale for the
use of asking prices and explore the implications of this mechanism for equilibrium prices and
allocations. Below, we compare our normative and positive results, respectively, with the existing
literature.
As mentioned above, implementing the planner’s allocation requires achieving efficiency along
two margins. First, a seller’s mechanism has to induce socially efficient search behavior by buyers;
mechanisms posted by other sellers, which is standard in this literature; such collusive behavior would seem to violate
the competitive spirit that motivates our analysis.
6Case and Shiller (2003) and Han and Strange (2013) document that a significant fraction of real estate transactions
occur at the asking price, and (in some locations) a number of transactions also occur above the asking price.
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this requires that each buyer’s ex ante expected payoff is equal to his marginal contribution to
the expected surplus at that seller. Second, a seller’s mechanism must maximize the surplus after
buyers arrive; that is, the mechanism must ensure that the ex post allocation of the good is efficient.
These two margins have been studied extensively in separate literatures.
The first margin is a critical object of interest in the literature on competitive (or directed)
search, such as Moen (1997), Burdett et al. (2001), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), and Julien
et al. (2000), to name a few. While these papers have often found that the market equilibrium
decentralizes the planner’s solution, their results do not extend to our environment. The reason
is that, in these papers, the size of the surplus after buyers arrive is independent of the pricing
mechanism. Hence, a simple mechanism, like a price or a wage, can control the division of the
expected surplus in an arbitrarily flexible way without any ramifications for ex post efficiency.
Therefore, within this literature, the papers that are most related to our work are McAfee (1993),
Peters and Severinov (1997), Burguet and Sa´kovics (1999), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), Vira´g
(2010), Kim and Kircher (2015), Albrecht et al. (2012), and Lester et al. (2015), who consider
environments where the pricing mechanism that is posted does effect the size of the surplus after
buyers arrive. However, in these papers the ex post efficient allocation of the good is typically fairly
trivial, and hence can be implemented with a simple, simultaneous mechanism (like an auction with
no reserve price).
In contrast, our model—where buyers incur a cost to learn their valuation—requires that we
consider a competitive search model where sellers post sequential mechanisms; to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to do so. We establish that the mechanism that achieves the
efficient ex post allocation also induces efficient search decisions by buyers ex ante.
Sequential mechanisms have received much more attention in the literature that focuses on
the second margin highlighted above but abstracts from the first margin, i.e., the literature that
studies the allocation of a good when a monopolist seller faces a fixed number of buyers who can
learn their valuation at a cost. However, the prevailing wisdom in this literature is that the optimal
mechanism in this environment will require that the seller have access to a number of different
instruments. For instance, within this literature, the paper that is closest to ours is Cre´mer et al.
(2009); indeed, the problem that each seller in our environment faces is analyzed as a special case
in their paper. They show that, in this setting, the seller optimally selects a sequential mechanism
that requires a series of different take-it-or-leave-it offers and participation fees, both of which
may vary according to the number and realizations of previous bids.7 Deeming such a mechanism
implausibly elaborate and demanding, Bulow and Klemperer (2009) instead focus on two “plain
7These take-it-or-leave-it offers act like a sequence of asking prices which, along with participation fees, are
calibrated just right to extract all of the buyers’ surplus. In a similar environment, Burguet (1996) also shows that one
way to implement the efficient allocation is through a relatively complicated sequence of reserve prices and bidding
subsidies.
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vanilla” mechanisms—a simultaneous auction and a simple sequential mechanism—and identify
a trade-off between revenue-maximization and efficiency.
In contrast to these papers, the mechanism we consider is relatively simple—sellers post a
single number—and yet the trade-off in Bulow and Klemperer (2009) does not arise; the asking
price is both revenue-maximizing and efficient.8
The reason for this difference is twofold. First, it turns out that the information made available
to buyers has important effects on the structure of the optimal mechanism. Cre´mer et al. (2009)
and Bulow and Klemperer (2009) assume that prospective buyers observe both the number and
behavior of previous bidders who have entered the mechanism, which implies that the optimal
mechanism offers different asking prices (and charges different fees) to each buyer who inspects
the good. We allow the sellers in our model to control what information is available to buyers,
and they choose not to reveal information about previous bidders. This change alone implies that
sellers would set the same asking price for all buyers, albeit with an admission fee attached.9 The
second reason our results are different is that the number of buyers who can potentially inspect a
seller’s good is exogenous in the papers cited above, whereas in our model it is the endogenous
outcome of a game in which sellers compete for buyers. In this competitive setting, as we noted
earlier, admission fees are driven to zero in equilibrium.10
Turning to the positive results, our explanation is of course not the only plausible reason why
asking prices might serve a useful role.11 For one, if buyers are risk averse, an asking price offers a
way of reducing the uncertainty an individual buyer faces in certain (not necessarily optimal) types
of auctions, and hence introducing this mechanism can potentially increase a seller’s revenues;
see, e.g., Budish and Takeyama (2001), Mathews (2004), or Reynolds and Wooders (2009). A
8Roberts and Sweeting (2013) also compare the performance of a simultaneous auction and a simple sequential
mechanism, though they assume buyers have some information about their valuation before making an entry decision.
Interestingly, the asking price mechanism in our model convexifies, in a way, the binary choice between these two
pricing schemes; as we discuss below, one can interpret our mechanism in such a way that the asking price determines
the probability of having an auction (after all buyers have inspected the good) as opposed to a sequential sale.
9The relevant issue, then, is whether sellers can prevent buyers from observing the number of other buyers that
have inspected the good and their bids. Obviously, in some cases this is possible and in other cases it is not. In this
sense, our results are best viewed as complementary to those of Cre´mer et al. (2009) and Bulow and Klemperer (2009).
We discuss the role of the information structure in greater detail in Section 4.
10In a different environment, Peters (2001) also finds that sellers who would charge positive admission fees in a
monopolistic setting optimally choose not to charge fees in a competitive setting. It is also worth noting that a similar
insight emerges from models that study the problem of a single seller who selects a mechanism to sell a good, and
a large number of buyers who can choose to participate in the mechanism at a cost; see, e.g., Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1987), McAfee and McMillan (1987), and Levin and Smith (1994). The only difference is that the “cost” to a buyer
from visiting a seller in a competitive search model is the opportunity cost of not visiting other sellers, which is an
equilibrium object, while the cost of participating in these models with one seller is an explicit entry cost, which is
exogenous.
11A different, but related, pricing mechanism is one where sellers offer a discounted price to buyers who purchase
the good immediately, which is intended to deter buyers from continuing to search for a better price; see, e.g., Arm-
strong and Zhou (2014).
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second explanation for asking prices, which also assumes that it is costly for buyers to learn their
valuation, is proposed by Chen and Rosenthal (1996) and Arnold (1999). In their environment, a
holdup problem emerges when a buyer and seller bargain over the terms of trade after the buyer
incurs the inspection cost. An asking price is treated as a ceiling on the bargaining outcome and
thus partially solves this holdup problem by serving as an ex ante guarantee that some rents will
be transferred from the seller to the buyer. Hence, our paper is similar in that we also study how
a seller’s commitment to a pricing mechanism can induce buyers to inspect when they otherwise
would not. However, there are a number of important differences as well: in our model, a seller’s
pricing decision also effects the number of buyers who arrive to inspect the good and the allocation
of the good after inspections occur. Moreover, we show that the asking price is optimal for sellers
given almost any mechanism one could imagine, while it’s not clear in Chen and Rosenthal (1996)
whether the mechanism they consider is the best way to solve the holdup problem they describe.12
A trading mechanism that bears some resemblance to an asking price can also emerge if it
is costly for sellers to meet with each buyer, as in McAfee and McMillan (1988). In this case,
the price that sellers advertise serves as a commitment device to keep meeting with buyers until
a sufficiently high bid has been received, despite an incentive ex post to stop earlier. Hence,
this quoted price is playing the opposite role as the asking price in our model; according to our
explanation, asking prices serve as a promise to stop sampling after a sufficiently high bid, despite
an incentive ex post to continue.13
Finally, asking prices may serve as a device to signal sellers’ private information. For exam-
ple, in Albrecht et al. (2015), sellers with heterogeneous reservation values use asking prices to
signal their type, which allows for endogenous market segmentation. We view this line of research
as complementary to our own; certainly the ability of asking prices to signal a seller’s private
information, which we ignore, is important.14
12More generally, the various theories of asking prices described above all consider the problem of a seller in
isolation. Therefore, though each one certainly captures a significant component of what asking prices do, they also
abstract from something important: the fact that buyers can observe and compare multiple asking prices at once is
not only realistic in many markets, but also seems to be a principal consideration when sellers are determining their
optimal pricing strategy.
13To be more precise, McAfee and McMillan (1988) consider a procurement auction in which a buyer meets with
a sequence of sellers and each meeting is costly to the buyer; this is equivalent to our environment with the seller
incurring the cost of each meeting. Switching which party bears the inspection cost not only changes the entire
rationale for an asking price, as described above, but it also changes the nature of the revenue-maximizing mechanism;
the solution to our model with this alternative cost structure is available upon request.
14Menzio (2007), Delacroix and Shi (2013), and Kim and Kircher (2015) also study the signalling role of prices in
directed search equilibria. However, in papers like Albrecht et al. (2015) and Menzio (2007), asking prices are not
uniquely determined, and hence these models are somewhat limited in their ability to draw positive implications about
the relationship between asking prices, transaction prices, and market conditions.
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2 The Environment
Players. There is a measure θb of buyers and a measure θs of sellers, so that Λ = θb/θs denotes
the ratio of buyers to sellers. Buyers each have unit demand for a consumption good, and sellers
each possess one, indivisible unit of this good. All agents are risk-neutral and ex ante homoge-
neous.
Search. Buyers can visit a single seller in attempt to trade. Frictions arise because buyers cannot
coordinate with one another when choosing a seller to visit, but rather they must use symmetric
strategies.15 As a result, the number of buyers to arrive at each seller, n, will be distributed ac-
cording to a Poisson distribution.16 As is customary in the literature on directed (or competitive)
search, we will refer to the expected number of buyers to arrive at a particular seller as the “queue
length,” which we denote by λ. As we describe in detail below, the queue length at each seller will
be an endogenous variable, determined by the equilibrium behavior of buyers and sellers.
Preferences. All sellers derive utility y from consuming their own good, and this valuation is
common knowledge. A buyer’s valuation for any particular good, on the other hand, is not known
ex ante. Rather, once buyers arrive at a particular seller, they must inspect the seller’s good in order
to learn their valuation, which we denote by x. We assume that each buyer’s valuation is an iid
draw from a distribution F (x) with support in the interval [x, x], and that the realization of x is the
buyer’s private information.
We assume, for simplicity, that y ∈ [x, x] . This is a fairly weak assumption; the probability
that a buyer’s valuation x is smaller than y can be driven to zero without any loss of generality.
Moreover, much of the analysis remains similar when y < x, though the algebra is slightly more
involved.
Inspection Costs. A key friction in the model is that the process of inspecting a good is costly
to the buyer. In particular, after a buyer arrives at a seller, we assume that he must pay a cost k in
order to learn his valuation x. As we discussed in footnote 3, such costs come in many forms, both
explicit (i.e., paying for an inspection) and implicit (i.e., the time it takes to learn one’s valuation);
we use k to capture all of these costs.
We restrict our attention to the region of the parameter space in which the cost of inspecting
15This assumption is often motivated by the observation that coordination among anonymous buyers in a large
market seems fairly implausible.
16More precisely, the Poisson distribution arises as the limit of an urn-ball specification with a finite number of
agents in which each buyer chooses a single seller, but buyers are restricted to symmetric strategies. See, e.g., Burdett
et al. (2001).
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the good does not exhaust the expected gains from trade. In particular, we assume that
k <
∫ x
y
(x− y) f(x)dx. (1)
Note that the inequality in (1) does not necessarily imply that a buyer would always choose to
inspect the good. In what follows, we will assume that a buyer indeed does have incentive to
inspect the good before attempting to purchase it, and in Section 7 we derive a sufficient condition
to ensure that this is true in equilibrium.
Gains from Trade. When n buyers arrive at a seller, the trading protocol in place will determine
how many buyers i ≤ nwill have the opportunity to inspect the good before exchange (potentially)
occurs. We normalize the payoff for a buyer who does not inspect, and thus does not trade, to zero.
Therefore, if a buyer with valuation x acquires the good after the seller has met with i buyers, the
net social surplus from trade is x− y − ik. Alternatively, if the seller retains the good for himself
after i inspections, the net social surplus is simply −ik.
3 The Planner’s Problem
In this section, we will characterize the decision rule of a (constrained) benevolent planner whose
objective is to maximize net social surplus, subject to the constraints of the physical environment.
These constraints include the frictions inherent in the search process, as well as the requirement
that buyers’ valuations are costly to learn.
The planner’s problem can be broken down into two components. First, the planner has to
assign queue lengths of buyers to each seller, subject to the constraint that the sum of these queue
lengths across all sellers cannot exceed the total measure of available buyers, θb. Second, the
planner has to specify the trading rules for agents to follow after the number of buyers that arrive
at each seller is realized. We discuss these specifications in reverse order.
Optimal Trading Protocol. Suppose n buyers arrive at a seller. As is well-known in the liter-
ature (see e.g. Lippman and McCall, 1976; Weitzman, 1979; Morgan and Manning, 1985), it is
optimal in this case for the planner to let buyers inspect the good sequentially, and to assign the
good immediately whenever a buyer’s valuation exceeds a cutoff, x∗, which equalizes the marginal
cost of an additional inspection with the marginal benefit. Importantly, note that the cutoff does
not depend on the total number of buyers n, the number of buyers who have inspected the good so
far i, or the history of valuations (x1, ..., xi). The following lemma formalizes this result.
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Lemma 1. Suppose n ∈ N buyers arrive at a seller. Letting x∗ satisfy
k =
∫ x
x∗
(x− x∗)f(x)dx, (2)
the planner maximizes social surplus by implementing the following trading rule:
(i) If n > 1 and i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n−1}, the seller should stop meeting with buyers and allocate the
good to the agent with valuation x̂i ≡ max{y, x1, ..., xi} if, and only if, x̂i ≥ x∗. Otherwise,
the seller should meet with the next buyer.
(ii) If n=1 or i = n, the seller should allocate the good to the agent with valuation x̂n.
Optimal Queue Lengths. We now turn to the optimal assignment of queue lengths across sellers,
given the optimal trading protocol for after buyers arrive. Notice immediately that the planner’s
cutoff x∗ is not only independent of the number of buyers, n, but also independent of λ, which gov-
erns the distribution over n. The reason is that the optimal stopping rule, on the margin, balances
the costs and expected gains of additional meetings, conditional on the event that there are more
buyers in the queue. The probability of this event, per se, is irrelevant: since the seller neither in-
curs additional costs nor forfeits the right to accept any previous offers if there are no more buyers
in the queue, the probability distribution over the number of buyers remaining in the queue—and
thus λ—does not affect the planner’s choice of x∗.
Let S (xp, λ) denote the expected surplus generated at an individual seller whom the planner
assigns a cutoff xp and a queue length λ. In order to derive this function, it will be convenient to
define
qi(x;λ) =
λi (1− F (x))i
i!
e−λ(1−F (x)). (3)
In words, qi(x;λ) is the probability that a seller is visited by exactly i buyers, all of whom happen
to draw a valuation greater than x (when all buyers’ valuations are learned). In what follows, we
will suppress the argument λ for notational convenience.
The net surplus generated at a particular seller is equal to the gains from trade, less the inspec-
tion costs. To derive the expected gains from trade at a seller with cutoff xp and queue length λ,
first suppose that n buyers arrive at this seller. There are three relevant cases. First, with probability
F (y)n all n buyers draw valuation x < y, in which case there are no gains from trade. Second, with
probability F (xp)n−F (y)n, the maximum valuation among the n buyers is a value x ∈ (y, xp), in
which case the gains from trade are x − y. Note that the conditional distribution of this maximal
valuation x has density [nF (x)n−1f(x)] / [F (xp)n − F (y)n]. Finally, with probability 1−F (xp)n,
at least one buyer has valuation x ≥ xp. In this case, the seller trades with the first buyer he en-
counters with a valuation that exceeds xp; this valuation is a random drawn from the conditional
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distribution f(x)/ [1− F (xp)]. Taking expectations across values of n, the gains from trade at a
seller with cutoff xp and queue length λ, in the absence of inspection costs, are
∞∑
n=1
e−λλn
n!
{∫ xp
y
(x− y)nF (x)n−1f(x)dx+ [1− F (xp)n]
∫ x
xp
(x− y) f(x)
1− F (xp)dx
}
=
∫ xp
y
(x− y)λq0 (x) f(x)dx+ [1− q0 (xp)]
∫ x
xp
(x− y) f(x)
1− F (xp)dx. (4)
Now consider the expected inspection costs incurred by buyers at a seller with cutoff xp and
queue length λ. If a buyer arrives at a seller along with n other buyers, he will occupy the (i+ 1)th
spot in line, for i ∈ {0, ..., n}, with probability 1/(n + 1). In this case, he will get to meet with
the seller only when all buyers in spots 1, ..., i draw x < xp, which occurs with probability F (xp)i.
Taking expectations over n implies that the ex ante probability that each buyer gets to meet with a
seller with queue length λ, given a planner’s cutoff of xp, is
∞∑
n=0
e−λλn
n!
{
n∑
i=0
F (xp)i
1
n+ 1
}
=
1− q0(xp)
λ [1− F (xp)] . (5)
Note that this probability approaches one from below as xp goes to x¯. Moreover, since the expected
number of buyers to arrive at this seller is λ, the total expected inspection cost incurred by all buyers
is simply
(
[1− q0(xp)] / [1− F (xp)]
)
k.
Using the results above, the expected surplus generated by a seller with queue length λ and
stopping rule xp can be written as
S (xp, λ) =
∫ xp
y
(x− y)λq0 (x) f(x)dx+ 1− q0(x
p)
1− F (xp)
[∫ x
xp
(x− y)f(x)dx− k
]
. (6)
Given the optimality of xp = x∗ for any λ, the objective of the planner is then to choose queue
lengths at each seller, λj for j ∈ [0, θs], to maximize total surplus
∫ θs
0
S(x∗, λj)dj subject to the
constraint that
∫ θs
0
λjdj = θb.
In the following lemma, we establish an important property of the surplus at a particular seller
when the optimal trading rule is in place.
Lemma 2. S(x∗, λ) is strictly concave in λ.
Two factors contribute to the concavity of S(x∗, λ) with respect to λ. First, as is standard in
models of directed search, the probability that a seller trades is concave in the queue length. This
force alone typically implies that the planner assigns equal queue lengths across (homogeneous)
sellers. However, in our environment there is an additional force, since the ex post gains from trade
are also concave in the number of buyers that arrive: each additional buyer is less likely to meet
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the seller and, conditional on meeting, is less likely to have a higher valuation than all previous
buyers.
The Solution to the Planner’s Problem. Taken together, lemmas 1 and 2 are sufficient to estab-
lish that the planner maximizes total surplus by assigning equal queue lengths across all sellers, so
that λj = Λ for all j. The following proposition summarizes the planner’s solution.
Proposition 1. The unique solution to the planner’s problem is to assign equal queue lengths Λ to
each seller. After buyers arrive, the planner lets buyers inspect the good sequentially and assigns
the good immediately whenever a buyer’s valuation exceeds x∗. When all valuations are below x∗
and the queue is exhausted, the planner assigns the good to the agent with the highest valuation.
4 The Decentralized Equilibrium
We now introduce a method of price determination that we call an “asking price mechanism.” We
show that, when a seller uses this mechanism, buyers who inspect the good will truthfully reveal
their valuations; inspections will continue until the first buyer in the queue draws a valuation above
some (stationary) threshold; and, if no buyer draws a valuation above this threshold, the good
will be allocated to the agent with the highest valuation. Given these features, the asking price
mechanism is a natural candidate to implement the planner’s solution described in Proposition 1.
However, as we explain below, a seller’s choice of an asking price actually plays two roles: it
determines the threshold conditional on a given number of buyers showing up (in expectation), but
it also determines the expected number of buyers to begin with. Given these two separate roles,
it is not obvious what asking prices sellers will choose in equilibrium, or whether their optimal
choices will implement the constrained efficient allocation.
In this section, we characterize equilibrium asking prices and establish that the decentralized
equilibrium indeed coincides with the solution to the planner’s problem. Then, in Section 5, we
prove that the asking price mechanism is, in fact, a seller’s optimal mechanism; that is, there is no
mechanism that provides a seller with a higher payoff, irrespective of the mechanisms posted by
other sellers.
Asking Price Mechanism. An asking price mechanism, or APM, has two components: an ask-
ing price and a specific protocol that occurs after an arbitrary number of buyers arrive. More
specifically, suppose a seller has posted an asking price a and n buyers arrive. The APM dictates
that the seller will meet buyers one at a time, with each successive buyer being chosen randomly
from the set of remaining buyers, until one of the buyers bids the asking price or all buyers are
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met. During a meeting, a buyer incurs the inspection cost k, learns his valuation x, and submits a
bid b. Importantly, when a buyer bids, he knows neither the number of other buyers at the seller,
n− 1, nor his place in the queue.17
If the buyer bids b ≥ a, his bid is accepted immediately and trade ensues; the asking price a
is the price at which the seller commits to selling his good immediately (and subsequently stops
meeting with other buyers). If b < y, then the bid is rejected and the seller moves to the next buyer.
Finally, if b ∈ [y, a), then the bid is neither rejected nor immediately accepted. Instead, the seller
registers the bid and proceeds to meet the next buyer in line (if there is one). Again, the buyer
incurs the cost k, learns her valuation x, and submits a bid b.
The process described above repeats itself until either the seller receives a bid b ≥ a, or until he
has met with all n buyers. In the latter case, he sells the good to the highest bidder at a price equal
to the highest bid, as long as that bid exceeds his own valuation y. A seller who trades at price b
receives a payoff equal to b, while a seller who does not trade receives payoff y. The payoff to a
buyer who trades at price b is x− b−k. A buyer who meets with a seller but does not trade obtains
a payoff −k. Finally, the payoff of a buyer who does not meet with a seller is equal to zero.
A Buyer’s Strategy and Payoffs. Given an arbitrary distribution of asking prices posted by
sellers, we now describe buyers’ optimal search and bidding strategies. We work backwards, first
deriving a buyer’s optimal behavior and payoffs conditional on meeting a seller who posted an
asking price a and attracted a queue λ. Then, given these payoffs, we derive buyers’ optimal
search behavior, which determines the queue length λ that corresponds to each asking price a.
To derive buyers’ behavior and payoffs after arriving at a seller, it’s helpful to note that the
APM described above is equivalent to a mechanism in which buyers are randomly placed in line;
each buyer is sequentially offered the opportunity to purchase the good at the asking price a, in
which case trade occurs immediately; and, if no buyer chooses to pay the asking price, the good is
allocated according to a first-price sealed-bid auction, where buyers are not told how many other
buyers are also participating in the auction. As we will see, this alternative interpretation is helpful
because it allows us to draw upon well-known results in the auction theory literature.18
We conjecture, and later confirm, that there exists a cutoff, which we denote xa, such that
a buyer with valuation xa is exactly indifferent between paying the asking price and waiting to
17Note that the information available to the buyers should be viewed as a feature of the mechanism. Since we
establish below that this mechanism is optimal, it follows that sellers have no incentive ex ante to design a mechanism
in which buyers can observe either n or their place in the queue.
18This observation is also helpful because it implies that we can replace the first-price auction with any revenue-
equivalent auction without changing any of the substantive results below. In most markets, we think the first-price
auction most closely resembles the actual method of price determination. However, in Section 7, we explore the
implications of using a second-price (ascending bid) auction instead, and argue that this alternative can help rationalize
transaction prices above the asking price.
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(perhaps) participate in an auction. Therefore, if a buyer draws valuation x ≥ xa, he will pay a and
trade immediately. Otherwise, if x < xa, he will decline and take his chances with the auction.
Assuming that all other buyers follow such a strategy, consider a buyer who has incurred the
(sunk) cost k and discovered that his private valuation is x at a seller who has posted an asking
price a and has an expected queue length λ. To decide whether to accept the asking price or not,
the buyer needs to form beliefs about both the probability that the auction will take place and the
number of other buyers that will be bidding. Note that when the buyer is asked to inspect, he
updates his beliefs regarding both probabilities.19 In particular, conditional on the buyer meeting
the seller, the probability that an auction will take place is
λ (1− F (xa))
1− q0(xa) q0(x
a). (7)
To understand this expression, recall that the probability that a buyer gets to meet a seller is given
by (5) and that an auction takes place if, and only if, none of the buyers in the queue draw a
valuation above xa, which happens with (ex ante) probability q0 (xa). Applying Bayes’ rule then
yields the expression in (7).
Similar logic can be used to calculate the distribution over the number of competitors that
the buyer will face should an auction occur. The total number of buyers at the seller follows a
Poisson distribution with mean λ. The auction will take place if all of them have a valuation below
xa, which happens with probability F n (xa). Hence, conditional on there being an auction, the
number of competitors equals n with probability
e−λ
λn
n!
F n (xa)
q0 (xa)
= e−λF (x
a) (λF (x
a))n
n!
. (8)
In Lemma 3, below, we use these probabilities to characterize the buyer’s optimal bidding strategy
and expected payoff should he choose not to pay the asking price, conditional on the queue length
λ and the cutoff xa being chosen by other buyers.
Lemma 3. Consider buyers who arrive at a seller with queue length λ. If all buyers pay the asking
price if, and only if, their valuation x ≥ xa, then the optimal bidding strategy of a buyer who draws
valuation x ∈ [y, xa), conditional on reaching the auction, is
b̂(x) = x−
∫ x
y
q0 (x˜) dx˜
q0 (x)
< x, (9)
19In other words, the very act of meeting the seller and inspecting the good is informative, since inspecting the good
requires that no previous buyer drew a valuation above xa. In particular, after inspecting the good, a buyer’s posterior
belief that many buyers arrived at the seller falls, and he believes it is more likely that he will be competing against
relatively few other buyers.
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and this buyer’s expected payoff from the auction is
u(x) =
λ (1− F (xa))
1− q0(xa)
∫ x
y
q0 (x˜) dx˜. (10)
Since q0(x) is, in fact, a function of λ, so too is b̂(x), while u(x) is actually a function of both
λ and xa. Though we have suppressed these arguments for notational convenience, it should be
understood that, for example, the buyer’s expected utility from entering the auction depends on
both the expected number of buyers at the seller and the threshold strategy that they are playing.
Importantly, note that u(x) is strictly increasing in x, which confirms our conjecture that buyers
follow a threshold strategy. Moreover, the threshold xa must satisfy u(xa) = xa − a, or
a = xa − λ (1− F (x
a))
1− q0(xa)
∫ xa
y
q0 (x) dx. (11)
In the Appendix, we confirm that da
dxa
> 0, so that the relationship between a and xa is one-to-one.
Hence, given any a and λ, the buyer’s optimal bidding function is completely characterized by
b(x) =

0 if x < y
b̂(x) if y ≤ x < xa
a if xa ≤ x,
(12)
where b̂(x) is given by (9) and xa is determined by (11).20
Given a buyer’s optimal behavior conditional on meeting the seller, we can calculate the ex
ante expected utility that a buyer receives from visiting a seller who has posted an asking price a
and attracted a queue length λ,
U(a, λ) =
1− q0(xa)
λ (1− F (xa))
[∫ xa
y
u(x)dF (x) +
∫ x
xa
(x− a)dF (x)− k
]
, (13)
where, in a slight abuse of notation, xa ≡ xa(a, λ) is the implicit function defined in (11).
Given U(a, λ), the optimal search behavior of buyers is straightforward: given the set of ask-
ing prices that have been posted, along with the search decisions of other buyers, an individual
buyer should visit a seller (or mix between sellers) that maximizes U(a, λ). More formally, for an
arbitrary distribution of posted asking prices, let U denote the highest level of utility that buyers
can obtain; as is common in this literature, we will refer to U as the “market utility.” Then, for any
20Notice that limx→xa b̂(x) < a, which should be expected. Otherwise, for buyers with valuation x arbitrarily
smaller than xa, an arbitrarily small increase in their bid would yield a discrete increase in the probability of trading,
and hence a discrete increase in their expected payoff.
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asking price a that has been posted, the queue length λ(a) ≥ 0 must satisfy
U(a, λ(a)) ≤ U, with equality if λ(a) > 0. (14)
According to equation (14), buyers will adjust their search behavior in such a way to make them-
selves indifferent between any seller that they visit with positive probability.
A Seller’s Strategy and Payoffs. Given the optimal behavior of buyers, we can now characterize
the profit-maximizing asking price set by sellers. As a first step, we use the results above to derive
the expected revenue of a seller who has set an asking price a and attracted queue length λ:
R (a, λ) = q0 (y) y +
∫ xa
y
b̂ (x) dq0(x) + (1− q0 (xa)) a. (15)
Again, note that xa ≡ xa(a, λ) denotes the optimal cutoff for buyers characterized in (11) and b̂(x)
denotes the optimal bidding function characterized in (9). This expression captures the three possi-
ble outcomes for a seller: no buyers arrive with valuation x > y, in which case the seller consumes
his own good; no buyers arrive with valuation x > xa, but at least one buyer has valuation x > y,
in which case the seller accepts the bid placed by the buyer with the highest valuation; or at least
one buyer has a valuation x ≥ xa, in which case the seller receives a payoff a.
Sellers want to maximize expected revenue, taking into account that their choice of the asking
price awill affect the expected number of buyers that will visit them, λ. In particular, in equilibrium
the relationship between between a and λ will be determined by the equality
U(a, λ) = U. (16)
The implicit function defined in (16) is akin to a typical demand function: for a given level of
market utility, it defines a downward sloping relationship between the asking price a seller sets and
the number of customers he receives (in expectation). The seller’s problem can thus be interpreted
as a choice over both the asking price and the queue length in order to maximize revenue, subject
to (16). The corresponding Lagrangian can be written21
L (a, λ, µ) = R (a, λ) + µ [U (a, λ)− U] . (17)
21So long as U is sufficiently small, the solution will be interior and hence the first-order conditions of the La-
grangian are necessary. Sufficiency follows from the fact that the unique solution coincides with the planner’s alloca-
tion, as we prove below.
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Equilibrium. In general, an equilibrium is a distributionG (a, λ) and a market utility U such that
(i) every pair in the support of G is a solution to (17), given U ; and (ii) aggregating queue lengths
across all sellers, given the distribution G and the mass of sellers θs, yields the total measure of
buyers, θb. However, as we establish in the proposition below, in fact there is a unique solution to
(17), and hence G is degenerate. Furthermore, this solution coincides with the planner’s solution,
i.e., the equilibrium is efficient.
Proposition 2. Given assumption (1), the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by
a = a∗ ≡ x∗ − λ (1− F (x
∗))
1− q0(x∗)
∫ x∗
y
q0 (x) dx, (18)
xa = x∗ and λ = Λ at all sellers, with buyers receiving market utility U
∗ ≡ U(a∗,Λ). Hence, the
decentralized equilibrium coincides with the solution to the planner’s problem.
Asking Prices and Constrained Efficiency. Before proceeding, we offer a brief discussion of
the result in Proposition 2. Notice immediately that the asking price mechanism we describe has
all the right ingredients to implement the efficient allocation at each seller: it elicits buyers’ private
valuations sequentially, it implements a stationary cutoff rule, and it allows for the seller to trade
with any buyer that has inspected the good (i.e., it allows for perfect recall).
What is less clear is whether the asking price that sellers choose in equilibrium will implement
the efficient cutoff, x∗. The reason is that the choice of a is affecting two margins: the expected
number of buyers who arrive at the seller, λ, and the stopping rule after buyers arrive, xa. One way
to understand these two margins more clearly is to use the relationship
R(a, λ) = S (xa(a, λ), λ)− λU(a, λ)
to rewrite the Lagrangian (17), where xa(a, λ) is defined in (11). Taking first order conditions and
substituting the constraint, (16), we get that profit maximization requires
∂λ
∂a
[
∂S
∂λ
− U¯
]
+
∂S
∂xa
dxa
da
= 0. (19)
The first term in (19) represents the seller’s marginal revenue from increasing a, holding the
threshold xa constant. In particular, note that the marginal revenue from an additional buyer, in
expectation, is equal to the additional surplus this buyer creates, ∂S/∂λ, less the “cost” of acquiring
this buyer, U . The second term represents the seller’s marginal revenue from increasing a, holding
the queue length λ constant.
Profit maximization, of course, just requires that the sum of the two terms in (19) is equal to
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zero. Constrained efficiency, on the other hand, requires that each of the two terms in (19) is equal
to zero: implementing the solution to the planner’s problem requires both maximizing the surplus
after buyers arrive and inducing the right number of buyers to arrive in the first place. The former
requirement equates to ensuring that ∂S
∂xa
= 0, so that the asking price implements the stopping
rule xa = x∗. The latter demands that, in equilibrium, ∂S
∂λ
= U¯ ; this is a standard condition for
the ex ante efficient allocation of buyers across sellers, as it implies that each buyer receive (in
expectation) his marginal contribution to the match.22
A priori, there is no reason to think that one value of a will ensure that both of these conditions
are satisfied. Indeed, given that one instrument is affecting two margins, one could easily imagine
a seller being forced to trade off ex post efficiency—so that ∂S/∂xa 6= 0—in order to influence ex
ante demand.23 Clearly, the relationship between a, xa, and λ has to be just right in order to ensure
that both conditions are satisfied with a single choice of a.
A quick glance at equation (11), along with (7), reveals that the information structure is crucial
in determining this relationship between a, xa, and λ. In particular, this relationship depends on
the probability that a buyer wins the good given only the information contained in the fact that he
has met with the seller. This turns out to be exactly the right amount of information to reveal to
the buyer in order to ensure that such a simple, stationary mechanism can implement the optimal
stopping rule. To see this, suppose we replace our asking price mechanism with a standard (sealed-
bid) auction. In this case, buyers have no information about the valuations of other buyers, and one
can show that too many buyers ultimately inspect the good. Now suppose that we allow each buyer
to observe the bids of those who have inspected the good before him, as in Bulow and Klemperer
(2009). Then, in the simple sequential mechanism they study, each buyer has an incentive to
place a bid that inefficiently preempts further participation. Therefore, if buyers have too much
information, then too few buyers will ultimately inspect the good.24
With the equilibrium asking price, a buyer who is about to inspect the good is able to infer
just enough: namely, that no other buyer has had a valuation high enough to bid the asking price,
making it worthwhile to pay the inspection cost.25 However, he is not able to infer more, which
eliminates the strategic motive of previous bidders to pre-empt entry. In this sense, the equilibrium
asking price is essentially a “jump-bid” that does pre-empt entry, but precisely when it is efficient
22See, e.g., Mortensen (1982), Hosios (1990), and Moen (1997).
23If the seller had two instruments at his disposal—say, an asking price to implement a stopping rule and a fee (or
subsidy) to transfer rents at will—clearly the seller would choose an asking price to implement x∗ and a fee or subsidy
to independently influence the queue length λ. What’s interesting here is that such fees or subsidies are not necessary.
24This is precisely why Cre´mer et al. (2009) find that the optimal mechanism must include asking prices and fees
that vary with each buyer in the queue, which can be used to correct the distortions in the simple mechanism of Bulow
and Klemperer (2009).
25In a related environment with two bidders, Pancs (2013) also finds that partial disclosure is optimal for the seller.
Also see McAdams (2015), who studies optimal disclosure in an environment where buyers choose when to enter a
mechanism.
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to do so. Moreover, the size of the jump bid is such that each buyer, from an ex ante point of
view, receives exactly his expected contribution to the total surplus, which ensures that the socially
optimal number of buyers visit each seller to begin with.26
5 General Mechanisms
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium that arises when sellers compete by posting asking
prices, and establishes that the equilibrium coincides with the solution to the social planner’s prob-
lem. However, it remains to be shown that sellers would in fact choose to utilize the asking price
mechanism if we expanded their choice set to include more general mechanisms.
In this section, we establish several important results. First, even when sellers are free to post
arbitrary mechanisms, all sellers posting the optimal asking price mechanism described in Propo-
sition 2 remains an equilibrium. Moreover, while other equilibria can arise, all of these equilibria
are payoff-equivalent to the equilibrium with optimal asking prices; in particular, there is no equi-
librium in which sellers earn higher payoffs than they do in the equilibrium with optimal asking
prices. Finally, we show that any mechanism that emerges as an equilibrium in this environment
will resemble the asking price mechanism along several important dimensions: any equilibrium
mechanism will require that the seller meets with buyers sequentially, that meetings continue until
a buyer draws a valuation x∗, and that the (expected) payment by a buyer with valuation x ≥ x∗
is equal to a∗. Hence, though we cannot rule out potentially complicated mechanisms that sat-
isfy these properties, the fact that asking prices are both simple and commonly observed in the
real world suggests that they are a robust and compelling way to deal with the frictions in our
environment.
Mechanisms. Consider a seller who receives n buyers. In general, a mechanism is going to
specify an extensive form game that determines, for each i ∈ {1, ..., n},
1. a probability φi,n : X i−1 → [0, 1] that the ith buyer inspects the good conditional on the
messages (x˜1, ..., x˜i−1) ∈ X i−1 reported by previous buyers, where X = {∅} ∪ [x, x] is the
space of messages available to buyers, x˜ = ∅ ∈ X denotes the event that buyer i did not
inspect the good, and X 0 = {∅} by convention;
26To see that the information structure alone is insufficient to guarantee that a simple asking price is the optimal
mechanism, suppose the number of buyers at each seller is exogenous. In this environment, which resembles Milgrom
(2004, page 232), a seller who has access to only a simple asking price mechanism will again face a trade-off be-
tween revenue maximization and efficiency, as in Bulow and Klemperer (2009); an unrestricted seller would optimally
impose meeting fees on each buyer who inspects the good. Competition among sellers eliminates these fees.
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2. a disclosure rule σi,n : X i−1 → Σ that specifies the signal that the ith buyer receives condi-
tional on the vector of reports from previous buyers, (x˜1, ..., x˜i−1) ∈ X i−1, where Σ is the
space of signals that can be disclosed;27
3. a decision rule δ : Σ→ [0, 1] that specifies the probability that a buyer will inspect the good
conditional on receiving the signal σ ∈ Σ;
4. a report x˜ : Σ × X → X that the buyer sends to the seller conditional on receiving a signal
σ ∈ Σ and either not inspecting or discovering a valuation x ∈ [x, x];
along with
5. an allocation rule αn : X n → {0, 1, ..., n} which specifies that the good is allocated to either
the ith buyer in the queue, for i ∈ {1, ..., n}, or the seller (i = 0), conditional on the set of
messages (x˜1, ..., x˜n);
6. transfers τn : X n → Rn which specifies the transfers to/from each of the n buyers, condi-
tional on the set of messages (x˜1, ..., x˜n);
subject to standard feasibility and aggregate consistency constraints.
We will restrict attention to the set of all mechanismsM that satisfy individual rationality and
incentive compatibility. In particular, for everym ∈M, a buyer’s expected payoff when instructed
to inspect the good is non-negative, given the information available to him, and truthfully reporting
his valuation x (at least weakly) dominates reporting any x′ 6= x.28 In very similar environments,
Cre´mer et al. (2009) and Pancs (2013) show that these two additional restrictions—namely, that
buyers are both obedient when instructed to inspect and truthful in reporting their type — are
essentially without loss of generality.29
Given these implicit restrictions, a mechanism m ∈ M can simply be summarized by the
inspection probabilities and rules for disclosure, allocations, and transfers described above. Note
that the set M includes a mechanism that implements our equilibrium asking price mechanism;
we denote this mechanism by m∗a. The setM also includes mechanisms that implement a cutoff
27The set of potential signals is quite vast. For one, the seller could disclose the buyer’s exact place in line, some
information about his place in line (i.e., whether he is among the first n buyers) or no information about his place
in line. Similarly, the seller could disclose all of the valuations reported by previous buyers, no information about
previous buyers, or various statistics summarizing the reports that have been received, such as the maximum valuation
reported or whether any buyers had reported a valuation above some threshold.
28We are also implicitly assuming truthful disclosure, i.e., that the seller does not report false information to the
buyers.
29There are, however, two implicit restrictions on the mechanism space which are worth noting, though both are
standard in the literature on competing mechanisms (see, e.g., Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010). First, we do not allow
mechanisms to condition on buyers’ ex ante identities; identical buyers must be treated symmetrically. Second, we do
not allow mechanisms to condition on the trading mechanisms posted by other sellers.
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rule associated with other asking prices, as well as completely different, potentially much more
complicated, mechanisms.
Payoffs. For a given mechanism m, expected revenue can be calculated in the usual way, taking
expectations across the number n and the valuations of other buyers. Expected utility can be cal-
culated in a similar manner, taking expectations across the number n, a buyer’s (random) place in
line, and the valuations reported by other buyers. We denote the ex ante expected payoff of a seller
who posts a mechanismm ∈M and attracts a queue λ byR (m,λ), whileU (m,λ) represents the
expected payoff of each buyer in his queue. The total payoffs (net of y) cannot exceed the amount
of surplus S (m,λ) generated by the seller’s chosen mechanism, which in turn cannot exceed the
surplus created by the mechanism that implements the planner’s solution, S∗(λ) ≡ S(x∗, λ). That
is,
R (m,λ) + λU (m,λ)− y ≤ S (m,λ) ≤ S∗(λ) (20)
for all m and λ. Clearly, Pareto optimality requires that the surplus be divided between the seller
and the buyers, so we restrict attention to mechanisms that satisfy the first condition in (20) with
equality. If the second condition in (20) also holds with equality, i.e., the mechanism creates the
same amount of surplus as the planner’s solution, we will call the mechanism surplus-maximizing.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium in this more general environment is a distribution of mechanisms
m ∈ M and queue lengths λ ∈ R+ across sellers, along with a market utility U , such that (i)
given U , each pair (m,λ) maximizes profitsR (m,λ) subject to the constraintU (m,λ) = U ; and
(ii) aggregating queue lengths across all sellers yields the total measure of buyers, θb. Given this
definition, we now establish that a mechanism m ∈ M is an optimal strategy if, and only if, it
creates the same surplus and the same expected payoffs as the asking price mechanism described
in the previous section, where the asking price a is set to implement the cutoff x∗.
Proposition 3. Take any candidate equilibrium with market utility 0 < U <
∫ x
y
(x − y)f(x)dx −
k. Let m∗a denote the asking price mechanism that implements the cutoff x
∗, and let λa satisfy
U(m∗a, λa) = U . A mechanism m ∈ M, which attracts a queue length λ, maximizes a seller’s
expected profits if, and only if,
(i) S(m,λ) = S∗(λ);
(ii)R(m,λ) = R(m∗a, λa); and
(iii) λ = λa.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1. Consider a candidate equilibrium
with market utility U in which a seller posts a mechanism m1 and receives a queue λ1 satisfying
U = U(m1, λ1), yielding expected profitsR(m1, λ1)− y = S(m1, λ1)− λ1U1.
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The first result is that m1 must be surplus-maximizing. To see why, suppose it is not; that is,
suppose S(m1, λ1) < S∗(λ1), corresponding to point 1 in Figure 1. This seller’s expected profits
correspond to the intersection of the vertical axis with the line through point 1 that has slope U .
One can see immediately that this cannot be consistent with equilibrium behavior. For example,
the seller could deviate to a surplus-maximizing mechanismm2 that attracts the same queue length
λ1 but yields a larger surplus S(m2, λ1) = S∗(λ1), corresponding to point 2 in the figure.30 Since
this deviation increases the size of the surplus, while holding constant the market utility received
by the buyers, it strictly increases the seller’s profits, i.e.,R(m2, λ1) > R(m1, λ1).
In general, a seller can obtain an even higher payoff. As the figure shows, profits are maximized
at point 3. That is, not only must any equilibrium mechanism lie on the surplus-maximizing frontier
S∗(λ), it must also induce a queue length λ3 such that31
dS∗ (λ)
dλ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ3
= U. (21)
Equation (21) is a typical requirement for profit-maximizing behavior: the left-hand side is the
marginal benefit of attracting a longer queue length, while the right-hand side is the marginal cost.
Importantly, the asking price mechanism that implements x∗ satisfies this condition, as we have
demonstrated in the previous section. Hence, for any market utility U , a seller (weakly) maximizes
his revenue if he posts a surplus-maximizing asking price mechanism. In other words, irrespective
of the behavior of other sellers, it is always optimal for an individual seller to post an asking price
mechanism that implements x∗. Note that—out of equilibrium—the asking price that achieves this
may not be equal to a∗, since that requires U = U
∗
.
Finally, any profit-maximizing mechanism must attract a queue length equal to the queue length
at a seller who posts m∗a. Intuitively, since the queue length λa equates the marginal benefit of
attracting more buyers with the more marginal cost, any other queue length would yield the seller
strictly lower profits. Therefore, in equilibrium, all sellers must attract the same queue length, so
that λ = Λ. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the results in Proposition 3.
Corollary 1. All sellers posting the optimal asking price mechanism m∗a and attracting a queue Λ
is an equilibrium within the mechanism spaceM.
Therefore, even when sellers are free to post arbitrary mechanisms, posting an asking price
mechanism with a = a∗ is consistent with equilibrium behavior. Now, it is true that other mech-
anisms could also be utilized in equilibrium, but Proposition 3 implies that any such mechanism
30Such a deviation could be achieved by setting an asking price that implements the cutoff x∗, along with a fee (or
subsidy) that ensures the expected payoff to buyers—and hence λ1—was unchanged.
31Recall that S∗(λ) = S(x∗, λ) is strictly concave in λ.
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will be similar to the asking price mechanism along several important dimensions. To start, since
any equilibrium mechanism must be surplus-maximizing, and thus implement an allocation that
coincides with the unique solution to the planner’s problem, the mechanism must feature sequen-
tial meetings between the seller and the buyers, with a stopping rule x∗ that depends explicitly on
the realization of buyers’ valuations. Moreover, the mechanism must also allocate the good to the
agent with the highest valuation in the event that no agent draws a valuation x ≥ x∗.
Finally, since the ex ante probability that each buyer gets to meet with the seller must be equal
in any equilibrium, and any mechanism that arises in equilibrium must also be payoff-equivalent
to the equilibrium with optimal asking prices, it follows that the expected payment by buyers
with valuation x ∈ [x∗, x] must equal the optimal asking price. Therefore, even when sellers
utilize an alternative mechanism in equilibrium, the expected transfer from a buyer who “stops”
the sequential inspection process will, indeed, equal a∗. The following corollary summarizes.
Corollary 2. Any equilibrium strategy m ∈ M must specify that the seller meet with buyers
sequentially; that these meetings stop if, and only if, either the buyer draws a valuation x ≥ x∗ or
the end of the queue is reached; and that the expected payment for a buyer who draws valuation
x ≥ x∗ is equal to a∗.
6 Positive Implications
In this section, we flesh out some of the model’s implications for a variety of observable outcomes,
including the level of asking prices set by the sellers, the number of buyers who inspect the good at
each seller, and the ultimate transaction price. We study how these variables change with features
of the economic environment, such as the ratio of buyers to sellers, the degree of ex ante uncertainty
in buyers’ valuations, and the costs of inspecting the good.
Prices and Allocations. Figure 2 below plots a typical CDF of transaction prices, where we set
b = 0 to represent sellers that do not trade.32 Notice that a fraction q0(y) = e−Λ[1−F (y)] of sellers do
not trade, either because no buyers arrive, which occurs with probability q0(x) = e−Λ, or because
n ≥ 1 buyers arrive but their valuations do not exceed the seller’s valuation y, which occurs with
probability q0(y)−q0(x). A fraction q0(x∗)−q0(y) of sellers ultimately accept a bid b that is strictly
less than the asking price. Letting x̂(b) = b̂−1(x), where b̂(x) is defined in (9), the (cumulative)
distribution of winning bids b ∈
[
y, b̂(x∗)
)
is simply q0 (x̂(b)) . Finally, a fraction 1 − q0(x∗) of
sellers trade at the asking price.
32For the sake of illustration, all numerical examples below have been generated with the assumption that x is
uniformly distributed, though all of the results are true for arbitrary distributions.
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As we discussed above, notice that there is a mass point of transactions that occur at a∗ and a gap
in the distribution between b̂(x∗) and a∗. Intuitively, it cannot be optimal for a buyer to offer a
price arbitrarily close to the asking price; such a strategy would be dominated by offering b = a∗,
which would provide a discrete increase in the probability of trade, at the cost of an arbitrarily
small increase in the terms of trade.
Comparative Statics. Figures 3 and 4 below illustrate how equilibrium prices are affected by
changes in the ratio of buyers to sellers (Λ) and changes in the inspection cost (k). An increase in
Λ causes a decrease in the fraction of sellers who do not trade and an increase in the fraction of
sellers who trade at the asking price. Though x∗ is independent of Λ, notice that a∗ is not; it is easy
to verify that a∗ is an increasing function of Λ. More generally, the distribution of prices under a
larger Λ first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of prices under a smaller Λ. Hence, as
in standard models of competitive search, an increase in the buyer-seller ratio leads to higher prices
in equilibrium. Notice, however, that the degree of dispersion in prices will be non-monotonic in
Λ: though price dispersion exists for intermediate values of Λ, the equilibrium price distribution
becomes degenerate at b = y (b = x∗) as Λ converges to zero (infinity).
Alternatively, as the inspection cost k decreases, both the asking price a∗ and the cut-off x∗
increase. However, the buyers’ bidding function b̂(x) is unaffected, and hence the lower tail of the
equilibrium price distribution is unaffected. As a result, a decrease in k leads to fewer transactions
at the asking price. Finally, as k converges to zero, the optimal x∗ converges to x and the pricing
mechanism converges to a standard first-price auction.
INSERT FIGURES 3 and 4 HERE.
Information and Uncertainty. One might also be interested in the relationship between the ex
ante dispersion in buyers’ valuations, asking prices, and the ultimate transaction prices. For exam-
ple, suppose a new technology (e.g., the Internet) replaces an old technology (e.g., the newspaper),
allowing buyers to learn more information about each seller’s good before choosing a seller to visit.
Given this information, suppose now that a buyer can identify a fraction η of goods that he would
prefer, and a fraction 1−η of goods that he would not. Formally, a good that is preferred will yield
a valuation x ∈ [x′, x], while a good that is not will yield the buyer a valuation x ∈ [x, x′], where
x < x′ ≤ y < x. Whether or not a good is preferred is again i.i.d. across goods for each buyer.
One can easily show that buyers only visit preferred sellers and that the resulting equilibrium
is very similar to what we characterize in Proposition 2, with the exception that the distribution F
with support [x, x] is replaced by the truncated distribution F ′ with support [x′, x]. Figure 5 below
illustrates the main effects of this technological improvement.
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First, notice that fewer sellers don’t trade, even though equilibrium queue lengths remain λ = Λ
at each seller. Intuitively, though the fraction of sellers who are visited by zero buyers remains
constant, the truncated distribution implies that it is less likely for a seller to be visited by n ≥ 1
buyers who all have a valuation strictly less than y. Second, notice that prices increase. This
occurs for several reasons. For one, sellers set higher asking prices; on the margin, the expected
gain from meeting with an additional buyer is larger since the truncated distribution F ′ first-order
stochastically dominates the original distribution F . Moreover, since other buyers are more likely
to draw a high valuation, there is more competition amongst buyers. This puts upward pressure on
the bidding function, further increasing transaction prices. Given these two forces, clearly sellers’
profits increase. Buyers, on the other hand, are more likely to trade, but at less favorable prices.
7 Assumptions and Extensions
In this section, we discuss several of our key assumptions, along with a few potentially interesting
extensions of our basic framework.
Transactions Above the Asking Price. In the equilibrium characterized in section 4, no trans-
action takes place at a price that exceeds the asking price. While we believe this prediction to be
adequate for certain markets, it is perhaps less desirable for the analysis of other markets, such
as housing. It is therefore important to emphasize that our model can easily explain such transac-
tion prices.33 To see this, note that one can interpret our asking price mechanism as a two-stage
process in which the seller first sequentially offers the good to each buyer at a price a∗ and then
organizes a first-price auction if no buyer accepts this offer. Given proposition 3 and standard
revenue-equivalence results, an alternative, optimal mechanism would be to replace the first-price
auction with a second-price auction in the second stage of the game.
Note that such a mechanism has a natural interpretation in the context of a housing market. It
corresponds to a scenario in which a seller, after getting a number of offers which are all below
the asking price, contacts the buyers again, informs them of the competing bids, and asks them
whether they would like to increase their offer. In that case, a “bidding war” ensues until a single
buyer remains, implementing the outcome of a second-price auction.
While this mechanism yields the same expected payoffs as our (first-price) asking price mech-
anism, the distributions of realized transaction prices will differ. Figure 6 shows a typical CDF
of transaction prices, where we again use a price equal to 0 to represent sellers that do not trade.
33We would like to thank Rob Shimer for pointing out this feature of our model.
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As buyers bid their valuation in a second-price auction, a transaction price above the asking price
arises when at least two buyers have a valuation above a but below xa (or otherwise one of them
would end the game by paying the asking price in the first stage). The probability of this event is
strictly positive because a < xa. The following lemma presents an explicit expression.
Lemma 4. Suppose all sellers post a two-stage mechanism consisting of an asking price in the
first stage, followed by a second-price auction. The probability that a transaction takes place at a
price exceeding the asking price then equals
e−λ(1−F (x
a)) − e−λ(1−F (a)) − λe−λ(1−F (a)) (F (xa)− F (a)) > 0.
Hence, this interpretation yields a micro-founded model in which a positive mass of transac-
tions occur at the posted asking price, while other transactions occur both below and above the
asking price.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
Commitment. Throughout our analysis, we also assume that sellers can commit to carrying out
the mechanism that they post. In particular, when a seller posts an asking price, we assume that he
commits to trading with the first buyer who offers to pay this price, even though ex post he would
prefer to renege and meet with all buyers.
Though this assumption is strong, we believe there are a number of ways to enforce this type
of behavior. Some are technological: for example, online auction sites like eBay and Amazon
allow sellers to pre-commit to an asking price (what they call “Buy-It-Now” or “Take-It” prices,
respectively), in which the auction immediately stops once this price offer is received. In other
cases, there exist institutions that make it costly to renege on an asking price. For example, as
Stacey (2012) points out, real estate agents in the housing market can serve as commitment devices.
For one, sellers are typically required to pay their real estate agent a commission if they receive
a bona fide offer at the asking price, whether or not the offer is accepted. Even without this
contractual clause, reputation concerns can help enforce commitment: if a homeowner repeatedly
turns down buyers who offer the posted asking price, he will not only discourage brokers from
listing his property, but he may also discourage other buyers from making offers in the future.
For all of these reasons, we think that the assumption of full commitment is a reasonable
approximation of the way goods are sold in certain markets. Of course, there are other markets
in which sellers may not be able to commit to such a device; extending our framework to allow
for limited commitment, or even no commitment (as in Kim and Kircher, 2015), could potentially
allow our model to capture these features as well. This extension is left for future work.34
34A stylized but particularly tractable approach would be to assume that, after the arrival of the buyers, the seller
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Endogenous Inspection. Throughout the text we assumed that buyers inspect the good and learn
their valuation before submitting a bid. One interpretation of this assumption is that it is a techno-
logical constraint: a buyer simply must go and meet with the seller in order to make an offer (say,
he needs to sign certain documents), and this process is costly.
However, for many applications it may be more appropriate to treat the decision to inspect the
good as endogenous. In such an environment, if the inspection cost k becomes too large, there may
exist states of the world in which the buyer (or the planner) prefers to forgo inspection and place
a bid (or trade) without knowing the valuation. The following lemma derives a condition on k to
ensure that this is never the case. That is, under the condition below, inspection before submitting
a bid or trading is optimal both for the planner and for the buyers in the decentralized market.
Lemma 5. The planner always instructs buyers to inspect the good upon meeting a seller and, in
the decentralized equilibrium, buyers always choose to inspect the good before submitting a bid if
and only if
k <
∫ y
x
(y − x) f (x) dx. (22)
Hence, the analysis in Sections 3 and 4 is consistent with an environment in which the decision
to inspect the good is endogenous, but k is sufficiently small to satisfy (22). In words, this inequal-
ity implies that inspection is always optimal as long as the cost of inspecting is smaller than the
costs associated with inefficient trade, which occurs when the seller values the good more than the
buyer who receives it. Before proceeding, we highlight two important points regarding (22). First,
inspection will, in general, almost always remain an optimal strategy for buyers in large regions
of the parameter space that do not satisfy this condition. Second, for most of the goods we have
in mind (e.g., a house or a car), the assumption that the inspection cost k is small relative to the
potential gains (or losses) from trade seems to be appropriate.
Heterogeneous Goods. We now consider the case where sellers possess different types of goods,
where these differences are verifiable ex ante (i.e., before inspecting). This case is of interest for
at least two reasons. First, it is an obvious extension; in the housing market, for example, there
are one-bedroom apartments and four-bedroom houses, and these differences are known before a
potential buyer chooses which seller to visit. Second, this extension highlights the type of questions
that can be considered in our market setting—where there are many sellers—but would be more
difficult (if not impossible) to analyze in a closely related set of models that assume only a single
seller, such as Cre´mer et al. (2009).
can renege on the asking price at a certain cost or in certain states of the world. This would not only allow our model
to accommodate transaction prices above the asking price, but it would also create a natural intermediate case between
our framework and the model by Albrecht et al. (2015).
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To this end, suppose that a fraction φi of sellers possess a good of type i ∈ {1, 2}, with
φ1 + φ2 = 1.35 Sellers of type i have a valuation yi for their own good, while buyers draw
valuations from a distribution Fi (x) after inspecting the good of a seller of type i ∈ {1, 2}. In the
following lemma, we establish that our main results are robust to the introduction of this type of
heterogeneity. That is, sellers will still choose to use an asking price mechanism in equilibrium, and
the corresponding equilibrium allocation will coincide with the solution to the planner’s problem.
Lemma 6. In a market with two different goods, all sellers using the asking price mechanism is
an equilibrium and this equilibrium is efficient.
In the corresponding equilibrium, submarkets form for each type of good, with an asking price
a∗i and a queue of buyers λ
∗
i , implementing a cutoff type x
∗
i .
36 However, in general, whether or not
a1 is greater or less than a2 will depend on a number of factors.
To start, suppose F1(x) = F2(x) and consider only the effect of y2 > y1. While this has no
effect on x∗—which is evident from equation (2)—it has opposing effects on the asking price. On
the one hand, a larger value of y implies that buyers must place higher bids to acquire the good,
which places upward pressure on the asking price of type 2 sellers. On the other hand, however,
a larger value of y also lowers the potential gains from trade, which decreases the queue length λ
and puts downward pressure on the asking price.
A similar tension arises if we consider the case where y1 = y2 but F2(x) first order stochastic
dominates F1(x). On the one hand, higher valuations for the type 2 good tend to put upward
pressure on bids, and hence on the asking price. However, there can be a subtle counter-force:
conditional on nobody paying a (fixed) asking price, buyers at a type 2 seller will believe that they
are facing fewer other buyers, on average, and hence bid less. The final effect on ai is ambiguous.
For these reasons, the relationship between asking prices across different types of goods is
actually quite complicated, and is ultimately a quantitative question that depends on the relative
measures of buyers and sellers, the sellers’ valuations for each type of good, and the buyers’
potential valuations. Perhaps these differences can help us understand why some goods tend to
typically sell below the asking price, while others more often sell at (or above) the asking price.
We leave a more serious exploration for future work.
8 Conclusion
In the majority of existing economic models, it is assumed that either (i) non-negotiable prices are
set by sellers; (ii) prices are the outcome of a bargaining game between a single buyer and seller;
35The results are essentially unchanged for N > 2 types.
36If the potential gains from trade at type 1 sellers are too small relative to those at type 2 sellers, then no buyer will
visit type 1 sellers and that submarket will collapse, i.e. λ∗1 = 0 (and vice versa).
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or (iii) prices are determined through an auction. However, many goods (and services) are sold
in a manner that is not consistent with any of these three pricing mechanisms, but rather seems
to combine elements of each. First, sellers announce a price, as in models with price-posting, at
which they’re willing to sell their good or service immediately. However, as in bargaining theory,
buyers can submit a counteroffer that will also be considered by the seller. Finally, in the event
that no buyer offers the asking price within a certain period of time, the set of counteroffers that
the seller has received are aggregated, as in an auction, and the object is awarded to the buyer with
the best counteroffer.
Despite the prevalence of this pricing scheme in many markets, it has received little attention
in the academic literature. In this paper, our objective was to construct a sensible economic model
to help us understand how and why this type of pricing mechanism can be an efficient way of
selling goods and services. Combining two simple, realistic ingredients—namely, competition and
costly inspection—we showed that asking prices emerge as the mechanism that is both revenue-
maximizing and efficient. As a result, the framework developed here provides a theory of asking
prices that is both micro-founded and tractable, offers a variety of testable predictions, and lends
itself easily to various extensions. Given these features, we believe that our model could be useful
for both theoretical and empirical work that focuses on markets in which asking prices are com-
monly used.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proving Lemma 1 requires establishing optimality of both the sequential search strategy and the
stopping rule with constant cutoff x∗. Both are well-known results in the literature, so we sketch
the intuition below and refer the reader to e.g. Lippman and McCall (1976), Weitzman (1979) and
Morgan and Manning (1985) for a more rigorous treatment.
Optimality of Sequential Search. To see that it can never be optimal to learn the valuation of
more than one buyer at a time, suppose n ≥ 2 buyers arrive at a seller, and consider the planner’s
decision of whether to learn the valuations of the first two buyers sequentially or simultaneously.
Let Zi(x̂i)− y denote the net expected surplus from continuing to learn buyers’ valuations (under
the optimal policy) given that the maximum valuation of the seller and the i buyers sampled so far
is x̂i ≡ max {y, x1, . . . , xi}.
The net social surplus from learning the first two buyers’ valuations simultaneously is then
−2k − y + max {x̂2, Z2 (x̂2)} , (23)
whereas the surplus from learning these valuations sequentially is
−k − y + max {x̂1,−k + max {x̂2, Z2 (x̂2)}}
= −2k − y + max {x̂1 + k, x̂2, Z2 (x̂2)} (24)
Clearly, the expression in (24) is weakly larger than (23) for any x1 and x2, and strictly larger
for some x1 and x2. Taking the expectation over all possible realizations therefore implies that a
planner would want to learn these valuations sequentially ex ante. It is straightforward to extend
this argument to learning the valuations of j > 2 buyers simultaneously after any number i ≤ n−j
buyers have already inspected the good.
Optimality of the Stopping Rule. Suppose the seller is visited by n ∈ N buyers. Let Zi(x̂i)
denote the expected surplus from sampling the (i+1)th buyer, for i < n, and let Vi(x̂i) = max{x̂i−
y, Zi(x̂i)}. To derive the optimal stopping rule, we utilize an induction argument. We begin with
the first step. If the seller has met with all n buyers, the decision is trivial: the good is allocated
to the agent (either one of the buyers or the seller) with valuation x̂n. The expected surplus is
Vn(x̂n) = x̂n − y.
Working backward, consider the planner’s problem when the seller has met with only n − 1
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of the n buyers. If the planner instructs the seller to stop meeting with buyers, again the good is
allocated to the agent with valuation x̂n−1, yielding surplus x̂n−1 − y. Alternatively, if the seller
meets with the next buyer, the expected surplus is Zn−1(x̂n−1)− y, where
Zn−1(x̂)− y = −k +
∫ x
x
max {Vn (x̂) , Vn (x)} f (x) dx,
so that
Zn−1(x̂) = −k + x̂F (x̂) +
∫ x
x̂
xf (x) dx. (25)
Notice immediately that Zn−1(x∗) = x∗ and
dZn−1(x̂)
x̂
= F (x̂) ∈ (0, 1), so that clearly x∗ is the
optimal cutoff after meeting with n− 1 buyers, and
Vn−1 (x̂) =
x̂− y for x̂ ≥ x∗Zn−1 (x̂)− y for x̂ < x∗.
Now consider the planner’s problem after the seller has met with n − 2 buyers. We establish
three important properties of Zn−2(x̂): (1) Zn−2(x̂) = Zn−1(x̂) for all x̂ ≥ x∗; (2) Zn−2(x̂) > x̂
for all x̂ < x∗; and (3) limx̂→x∗ Zn−2(x̂) = Zn−1(x∗) = x∗. Given these three properties, along
with the fact that dZn−2(x̂)
x̂
= dZn−1(x̂)
x̂
= F (x̂) ∈ (0, 1) for x ≥ x∗, it follows immediately that
x̂ ≥ Zn−2(x̂) if, an only if, x̂ ≥ x∗, and hence x∗ is the optimal cutoff again.
After meeting with n− 2 buyers, the expected surplus from another meeting when x̂n−2 = x̂ is
Zn−2 (x̂)− y = −k + Vn−1 (x̂)F (x̂) +
∫ x
x̂
Vn−1 (x) f (x) dx. (26)
If x̂ ≥ x∗, then Vn−1 (x̂) = x̂ − y and thus Zn−2 (x̂) = Zn−1 (x̂). Alternatively, if x̂ < x∗, then
Vn−1 (x̂) = Zn−1 (x̂)− y > x̂− y and
Zn−2 (x̂) = −k + Zn−1 (x̂)F (x̂) +
∫ x∗
x̂
Zn−1 (x) f (x) dx+
∫ x
x∗
xf (x) dx
> −k + x̂F (x̂) +
∫ x∗
x̂
xf (x) dx+
∫ x
x∗
xf (x) dx
= Zn−1 (x̂) > x̂.
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Finally, note that
lim
x̂→x∗
Zn−2 (x̂) = −k + Zn−1 (x∗)F (x∗) +
∫ x
x∗
xf (x) dx
= −k + x∗F (x∗) +
∫ x
x∗
xf (x) dx
= Zn−1(x∗) = x∗.
Therefore, the optimal cutoff after meeting with n− 2 buyers is x∗.
We have established that the following is true for j′ = 2:
1. Zn−j′(x̂) = Zn−j′+1(x̂) for all x̂ ≥ x∗.
2. Zn−j′(x̂) > x̂ for all x̂ < x∗.
3. limx̂→x∗ Zn−j′(x̂) = Zn−j′+1(x∗) = x∗,
so that
Vn−j′ (x̂) =
x̂− y for x̂ ≥ x∗Zn−j′ (x̂)− y for x̂ < x∗.
Now, suppose this is true for all j′ ∈ {2, 3, ..., j}. We will establish that it is also true for j + 1.
After meeting with n− j− 1 buyers, the expected surplus from another meeting when x̂n−j−1 = x̂
is
Zn−j−1 (x̂)− y = −k + Vn−j (x̂)F (x̂) +
∫ x
x̂
Vn−j (x) f (x) dx. (27)
If x̂ ≥ x∗, then Vn−j (x̂) = x̂ − y and thus Zn−j−1 (x̂) = Zn−1 (x̂). Moreover, given the first
assumption in the induction step, Zn−j (x̂) = Zn−1 (x̂), so that Zn−j−1 (x̂) = Zn−j (x̂).
Alternatively, if x̂ < x∗, then
Zn−j−1 (x̂) = −k + Zn−j (x̂)F (x̂) +
∫ x∗
x̂
Zn−j (x) f (x) dx+
∫ x
x∗
xf (x) dx
> −k + x̂F (x̂) +
∫ x
x̂
xf (x) dx = Zn−1 (x̂) > x̂
Finally, note that
lim
x̂→x∗
Zn−j−1 (x̂) = −k + Zn−j (x∗)F (x∗) +
∫ x
x∗
xf (x) dx
= Zn−1(x∗) = x∗.
Therefore, we have that the optimal cutoff after meeting with n− j − 1 buyers is x∗.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting (2) into (6) and integrating by parts yields
S (x∗, λ) = x∗ − y −
∫ x∗
y
q0 (x) dx.
Since x∗ is independent of λ, the second derivative of S (x∗, λ) with respect to λ then equals
d2S
dλ2
= −
∫ x∗
y
(1− F (x))2 q0 (x) dx < 0.

Proof of Proposition 1
Given Lemma 1, clearly a stopping rule of x∗ is optimal at all sellers. Then, given Lemma 2, it
follows that total surplus is maximized by assigning the same queue length λ = Λ to all sellers. 
Proof of Lemma 3
When the buyer declines to pay the asking price, he realizes that the auction will take place if
and only if all other buyers visiting the same seller have a valuation below xa. In the auction, the
buyer will face a number of competitors which follows a Poisson distribution with mean λF (xa).
Their valuations will be distributed according to F (x)
F (xa)
. Standard arguments imply that the expected
payoff for the buyer from participating in the auction equals the integral of his trading probability.37
That is, ∫ x
y
e−λF (x
a)(1− F (x˜)F (xa))dx˜ =
∫ x
y
q0 (x˜)
q0 (xa)
dx˜, (28)
where the integrand represents the probability that no other buyer has a valuation above x˜, condi-
tional on all valuations being below xa. Multiplying this payoff by (7) yields the desired expression
for u (x).
To derive the buyer’s optimal bidding function b̂ (x) in the first-price auction, note that (28)
should be equal to the product of the probability that the buyer wins the auction and his payoff
conditional on winning. That is,
q0 (x)
q0 (xa)
(x− b (x)) =
∫ x
y
q0 (x˜)
q0 (xa)
dx˜,
37See Peters (2013) for a detailed discussion. Peters and Severinov (1997) explicitly analyze the case with a Poisson
number of buyers.
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where the first factor on the left-hand side represents the probability that no other buyer has a
valuation above x, conditional on all valuations being below xa. Solving for b̂ (x) gives the desired
result. 
Proof of dadxa > 0
Differentiating (11) yields
da
dxa
=
1− q0(xa)− q1(xa)
1− q0(xa)
(
1 +
λf (xa)
1− q0(xa)
∫ xa
y
q0 (x) dx
)
> 0.

Proof of Proposition 2
Since the relation between a and xa is one-to-one, given λ, the seller’s maximization problem
can be rewritten as a choice over xa and λ, which turns out to be more convenient analytically.
Define R̂ (xa, λ) as the revenue of a seller with asking price a, queue λ and cutoff xa ≡ xa (a, λ).
Substituting a and b̂ (x) into R (a, λ), as given in (15), yields
R̂ (xa, λ) = xa − (1 + λ)
∫ xa
y
q0 (xˆ) dxˆ+ λ
∫ xa
y
F (x) q0 (x) dx.
One can derive Û (xa, λ), i.e., the expected payoff of a buyer visiting this seller, in a similar fashion:
Û (xa, λ) =
1
λ
(
1− q0(xa)
(1− F (xa))
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
]
+ λ
∫ xa
y
(1− F (x)) q0 (x) dx
)
.
(29)
The partial derivatives of R̂ (xa, λ) are equal to
∂R̂
∂xa
= 1−Q1(xa) > 0
∂R̂
∂λ
= λ
∫ xa
y
(1− F (x))2 q0 (x) dx > 0
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while the partial derivatives of Û (xa, λ) are
∂Û
∂xa
= −1−Q1(x
a)
λ
(
1− f (x
a)
(1− F (xa))2
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
])
< 0
∂Û
∂λ
= − 1−Q1(x
a)
λ2 (1− F (xa))
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
]
−
∫ xa
y
q0 (x) (1− F (x))2 dx,
since Q1(xa) < 1. Therefore, the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to xa, λ,
and µ, respectively, equal
0 = (1−Q1(xa))
(
1− µ
λ
(
1− f (x
a)
(1− F (xa))2
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
]))
(30)
0 = λ
∫ xa
y
q0 (x) (1− F (x))2 dx
(
1− µ
λ
)
− µ
λ2
1−Q1(xa)
(1− F (xa))
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
]
(31)
0 =
1− q0(xa)
λ (1− F (xa))
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
]
+
∫ xa
y
(1− F (xˆ)) q0 (xˆ) dxˆ− U.
Solving (30) implies
µ
λ
=
(
1− f (x
a)
(1− F (xa))2
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
])−1
,
so that (31) can be written as
0 =
[∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x)− k
]
×
µ
λ
{
−λf (x
a)
∫ xa
y
q0 (x) (1− F (x))2 dx
(1− F (xa))2 −
1−Q1(xa)
λ (1− F (xa))
}
.
Since the term in brackets on the second line of this equation is strictly negative, it must be that
the unique solution for xa satisfies
∫ x
xa
(x− xa) dF (x) = k. From this, it immediately follows that
xa = x∗ and µ = λ = Λ. Hence, the equilibrium is unique and it coincides with the solution to the
planner’s problem. Given xa = x∗ and λ = Λ, the optimal asking price follows from (11). 
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a candidate equilibrium with market utility 0 < U <
∫ x
y
(x − y)f(x)dx − k. Now, take
an arbitrary mechanism m1 that one or more sellers post in this equilibrium, which attracts a queue
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λ1 > 0 that satisfies U (m1, λ1) = U . This mechanism yields the seller a payoff R (m1, λ1) and
generates a surplus S (m1, λ1) = R (m1, λ1) + λ1U (m1, λ1)− y.
Now consider an asking price mechanismm∗a that implements the cutoff x
∗ and attracts a queue
length λa > 0 that satisfies U = U(m∗a, λa).38 From our results in Proposition 2, and the discussion
that follows, we know that S(m∗a, λa) = S
∗(λa) and
∂S∗(λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣
λ=λa
= U. (32)
Since m1 was chosen when m∗a was feasible, it must be that
S∗(λa)− λaU + y = R(m∗a, λa) ≤ R(m1, λ1) = S(m1, λ1)− λ1U + y.
Next, let λ∗ = arg maxλ S∗(λ) − λU . Since S∗(λ) is strictly concave, we are assured of a
unique solution that will satisfy
∂S∗(λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
= U.
From (32), it must be that λ∗ = λa. Moreover, since S(m1, λ1) ≤ S∗(λ1), we can write
R(m1, λ1) = S(m1, λ1)− λ1U + y ≤ S∗(λ1)− λ1U + y
≤ S∗(λ∗)− λ∗U + y
= S∗(λa)− λaU + y = R(m∗a, λa).
Hence, for any equilibrium mechanism m1, it must be that R(m1, λ1) = R(m∗a, λa). Moreover, it
must also be that λ1 = λa = λ∗. Otherwise, for any λ1 6= λ∗, R(m1, λ1) ≤ S∗(λ1) − λU¯ + y <
S(λ∗)− λ∗U¯ + y = R(m∗a, λ∗). This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
Finally, since these results hold for all sellers, it must be that λ∗ = Λ in equilibrium. There-
fore, for any m1 offered in equilibrium, we must λ1 = Λ, U(m1, λ) = U(m∗a,Λ) = U
∗
and
R(m1, λ1) = R(m
∗
a,Λ) = S
∗(Λ)− ΛU¯ + y; this is the result reported in Corollary 2.
Proof of Lemma 4
Consider a seller with n buyers. The sale price will be above asking price if i ∈ {2, . . . , n} buyers
draw a valuation between a and xa while the remaining n − i buyers draw a valuation below a.
38Note that λa depends on U . However, in what follows, we suppress this implicit relationship for notational
convenience.
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The probability of this event equals
n∑
i=2
n!
i! (n− i)! (F (x
a)− F (a))i F (a)n−i ,
which simplifies to
F (xa)n − n (F (xa)− F (a))F (a)n−1 − F (a)n .
Taking the expectation over n yields the desired expression. 
Proof of Lemma 5
For the planner’s problem, the proof proceeds by induction, much like the proof of lemma 1.
Suppose that n buyers visit a seller, the first n − 1 buyers learn their valuation, and no trade has
taken place because x̂n−1 ≡ max {y, x1, . . . , xn−1} < x∗. In this case, the planner has two options:
either let buyer n incur the inspection cost k and base the ensuing trading decision on x̂n, or avoid
the inspection cost by instructing the seller to trade with buyer n without knowing his valuation.39
In the former case, expected surplus generated by the match is Zn−1 (x̂n−1)− y, where
Zn−1(x̂) = −k + x̂F (x̂) +
∫ x
x̂
xf (x) dx,
while the latter case yields an expected surplus equal to
∫ x
x
xf (x) dx − y. Clearly, inspection is
preferred if and only if Zn−1 (x̂n−1)− y >
∫ x
x
xf (x) dx− y, or equivalently
k <
∫ x̂n−1
x
(x̂n−1 − x) f (x) dx.
This condition needs to hold for any feasible value of x̂n−1 in order to guarantee inspection by the
last buyer. Since the right-hand side is strictly increasing in x̂n−1, (22) is a necessary and sufficient
condition. The final step is then to show that this condition implies that inspection is also optimal
after meeting with n − j − 1 buyers for j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. This follows immediately from
Zn−j−1 (x̂) ≥ Zn−1 (x̂) for all x̂ and j, as shown in the proof of lemma 1.
Next, we analyze the market equilibrium described in section 4. Consider a deviating buyer
who does not inspect the good and therefore does not know his valuation. This deviant has three
options: 1) submit a bid below y, which will be rejected; 2) submit a bid between y and a; or
39The planner can of course also instruct the seller to immediately trade with the agent with valuation x̂n−1, but, as
shown in lemma 1, this is dominated by learning the valuation of the last buyer since x̂n−1 < x∗.
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3) bid the asking price and trade immediately. The choice between these options is equivalent to
choosing a type of buyer x′ ∈ [x, x] to mimic.
We first establish that it is optimal for the deviant to behave like a buyer who has a valuation x′
equal to the unconditional expected value of x, which we denote by xe = EF [x] ≡
∫ x
x
xf (x) dx.
To see this, consider the expected payoffs under each of the three options. First, a deviant who acts
like a buyer with valuation x′ ∈ [x, y] receives a payoff of 0. Second, if the deviant instead imitates
a buyer of type x′ ∈ (y, xa) and bids bˆ (x′), his payoff conditional on meeting with the seller is
u(x′|xe) = λ (1− F (x
a)) q0(x
′)
1− q0(xa)
[
xe − bˆ(x′)
]
.
Since bˆ (x′) is optimal in equilibrium, it follows that the deviant should choose x′ = xe and bid
bˆ (xe). Evaluating the expected payoff from this strategy yields
u (xe) =
λ (1− F (x∗))
1− q0(x∗)
∫ xe
y
q0 (x˜) dx˜, (33)
where u (xe) is increasing and convex in its argument. Finally, if the deviant mimics a buyer of
type x′ ∈ [x∗, x] and bids the asking price, he obtains a payoff
xe − a∗ = xe − x∗ + u (x∗) . (34)
Comparing the three payoffs reveals that the deviant maximizes his payoff by behaving as a
buyer with valuation xe. That is, he should submit a bid below y if xe < y and should bid bˆ (xe) if
xe ∈ [y, x∗). Note that the remaining case, xe ∈ [x∗, x], cannot occur under (22), since it implies
xe = −
∫ x∗
x
(x∗ − x) f (x) dx+ k + x∗
< −
∫ y
x
(y − x) f (x) dx+ k + x∗ < x∗.
To see whether the deviant benefits from not inspecting the good, define an auxiliary distribu-
tion F˜ (x) that resembles F (x), except that the mass below y and above x∗ is concentrated as mass
points at y and x∗, respectively. That is,
F˜ (x) =

0 if x < y
F (x) if y ≤ x ≤ x∗
1 if x∗ < x.
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Let x˜e = EF˜ [x] denote the expectation of x under this modified distribution. Under (22), it then
follows that x˜e > xe, since
x˜e − xe =
∫ y
x
(y − x) dF (x)−
∫ x
x∗
(x− x∗) dF (x)
=
∫ y
x
(y − x) dF (x)− k > 0.
The fact that u (x) is an increasing function then implies that u (xe) < u (x˜e), while the convex-
ity of u (x) implies that u (x˜e) < EF˜ [u (x)] by Jensen’s inequality. Note, however, that EF˜ [u (x)]
exactly equals the payoff from inspection, since
EF˜ [u (x)] = u (y) F˜ (y) +
∫ x∗
y
u (x) dF˜ (x) +
(
1− F˜ (x∗)
)
u (x∗)
=
∫ x∗
y
u (x) dF (x) + (1− F (x∗))u (x∗)
=
λ (1− F (xa))
1− q0 (xa)
[∫ x∗
y
∫ x
y
q0 (x˜) dx˜dF (x) + (1− F (x∗))
∫ x∗
y
q0 (x˜) dx˜
]
Hence, the payoff from inspection is strictly higher than the payoff from not inspecting.
To show that equation (22) is also necessary, consider the limit Λ → 0, such that a buyer who
meets with a seller knows that, with probability 1, he does not face competition from other buyers.
The optimal bid in that case is y and it follows immediately that inspection is better only if equation
(22) holds. 
Proof of Lemma 6
Compared to the homogeneous model, the environment gives rise to one extra decision, which
concerns the allocation of buyers across the two goods. Suppose that a fraction ψi of the buyers is
allocated to sellers of good i, with ψ1+ψ2 = 1. Conditional on ψi, the game within each submarket
is essentially the same as in the homogeneous model. Hence, it follows directly from proposition 1
that a planner assigns each seller of good i a queue λi (ψi) = ψiφi Λ and instructs him to implement
a cutoff x∗i , which is the solution to k =
∫ x
x∗i
(x− x∗i ) fi (x) dx. The surplus created by the seller
then equals
S∗i (λ (ψi)) = x
∗
i − yi −
∫ x∗i
yi
e−λi(ψi)(1−Fi(x))dx.
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Conditional on sellers using asking price mechanisms, it follows from proposition 2 that—for a
given ψi—all sellers of good i post an asking price equal to
ai (ψi) ≡ x∗i −
λi (ψi) (1− Fi (x∗i ))
1− e−λi(ψi)(1−Fi(x∗i ))
∫ x∗i
yi
e−λi(ψi)(1−Fi(x))dx.
A buyer who visits a seller of good i obtains an expected payoff
U i (ψi) =
∫ x∗i
yi
(1− Fi (x)) e−λi(ψi)(1−Fi(x))dx,
which is exactly his marginal contribution to surplus, ∂
∂λ
S∗i (λ (ψi)). Hence, by proposition 3,
asking price mechanisms are optimal even when sellers have access to a larger mechanism space.
Consider now the allocation of buyers to the two different goods. In the decentralized market,
each buyer chooses the submarket that maximizes his expected payoff, while a planner wants to
allocate buyers to the submarket in which their marginal contribution of surplus is highest. Since
U i (ψi) =
∂
∂λ
S∗i (λ (ψi)), these choices will coincide. There are three possible cases:
1. If U1 (0) ≤ U2 (1), then ψ∗1 = 0 and ψ∗2 = 1. That is, all buyers visit sellers of good 2.
2. If U1 (1) ≥ U2 (0), then ψ∗1 = 1 and ψ∗2 = 0. That is, all buyers visit sellers of good 1.
3. If U1 (0) > U2 (1) and U1 (1) < U2 (0), then—by the Intermediate Value Theorem—there
exists a ψ∗1 ∈ (0, 1) such that U1 (ψ∗1) = U2 (1− ψ∗1). That is, buyers randomize between
the sellers.

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Figure 1: Optimal Mechanisms
0 Λ3 Λ1
Λ
RHm1,Λ1L-y
RHm2,Λ1L-y
RHm3,Λ3L-y
S*HΛ3L
U
1
2
3
Λ3U
S*HΛL
Figure 2: Transaction Price CDF
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Figure 3: Effect of an Increase in the Buyer/Seller Ratio
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solid blue line = original equilibrium; dashed orange line = equilibrium with higher Λ.
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Figure 4: Effect of a Decrease in the Inspection Cost
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solid blue line = original equilibrium; dashed orange line = equilibrium with lower k.
Figure 5: Effect of Technological Improvement
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Figure 6: Transaction Prices Above the Asking Price
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